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Id.~Support by Relatives.-Provision in Welf. & Inst. 
as it read in that marri(od daughter of 
for old age benefits slHtll not be to make 
eontribution unless she has income which is her separate prop-
to do 
may not be eonstrued subjecting support payments 
she n'ceives from ex-husband after divorce, and which 
as basis for determination of her lia-
as this would in effect require her ex-husband 
which he was not 
[3] !d.-Support by Relatives.-Alimony is not ''income" within 
of of Old Security Law (see W elf. & 
of a responsible rela-
tive. 
[4] !d.-Support by Relatives.·-Where divorce decree orders pay-
ment of support for of wife and minor child 
but makes no what portion of monthly 
payments are for child's support and what portion for wife, 
it would not be appropriate for court, in action brought by 
county to recover from wife aid granted by it to her indigent 
mother under Old Security Law, to make apportionment 
which court would have to do before it could ascertain wife's 
liability; the proper forum for making such allocation is court 
in which divorce rend<·red. 
[5] !d.-Support by Relatives.--Ahility of divorced wife to support 
her indigent mother und<'r Old Agn Security Lnw is not shown 
when undetermined of income proved is not hers but 
is for minor child. 
APPEAI1 from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa Cmmty. Norman A. Gregg, .Judge. Heverscd. 
See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. 
§§ 7, 8; Am.Jur., Social Seeurity, 
McK. Dig. Reference: Old 
Old Age Security, 
Security, § 9. 
Gendel & Haskoff and Bernard 
Frances \Y. Collins, Distriet 
David ,J. Distrid 
CAH'l'EH, J .---Defendant 
her for $225 in favor of 
for the months and 
represents the alleged for those months of '"""''-v"~""' 
tho adult daughter of 1\lrs . .LiJta Hachenberger, for support 
furnished to the latter by plaintiff under the Old 
Law. & Inst. § 2000 et 
l''rom the stipulation of the parties and the findings of the 
court it appears defendant is the adult daughter of M:rs. Hach-
enberger. The latter made due application to plaintiff county 
and qualified under the Old Age Security Law to reeeive 
old age assistance. Plaintiff granted aid and paid lVIrs. Hach-
enberger $75 per month for the months June, July and Au-
gust, 1951. Thereafter Mrs. Hachenberger moved to another 
county. 'When the applieation \vas made defendant supplied 
to the board of supervisors a statement of responsible relative 
(Vv elf. & Inst. Code, § 2225) and refused the board's demand 
that she eontribute to the support of her mother. 
Defendant is divorced from her husband and has eustody 
of a minor ehild. Her sole ineome is what she receiyes from 
her former husband for the support of herself and child, the 
amount being a percentage of her ex-husband's earnings as a 
freelanee writer. 'l'he eourt found that during the months 
for which judgment was rendered ag<tinst her she received 
$660.60 per month support money; defemhmt was buying a 
home and a 1950 Chrysler, sending her ehild to a private 
sehool, and employing a gardener, yet aeeumnlated $1,400 
whieh she loaned to her former husband on a three-year note; 
that she was pecuniarily able to contribute $75 per month to 
the support of her mother. 
Defendant eontends: (1) That the support received by her 
from her ex-husband under the divorce deeree was not ineome 
within the meaning of section 2181 of the "\Velfare and Insti-
tutions Code and with only such income she is not a person 
pecuniarily able to support her mother within the provisions 
of seetion 2224 of that code; (2) that ewn including that 
ineome she is not pecuniarily able to support her mother 
i·ases, contribution;:; 
tiYes' Contribution Seale' may he 
visors may deem 
cant shall not he eontributious unless she 
has income UHder the 
sehedule io whieh refel'enee milde a relative with 
to ·with two persons 
to contribute per month to the 
person. Scetion 2224 of the same 
The board of shall deter-
aid has within the State 
able to eontt·ilmte to 
509 
cov-
the \Velfare and Institutions Code and it is the measure 
of the extent of the relative's liability to the 
It is to it we look to ascertain whether the 
relative is case, to reimburse the 
eounty. 
class mentioned. No 
supt·a, make refer-
ability'' of 
m"~~,.~,_ to one within the 
those terms, at least until the 1953 
section 2181. At the time here 
supra, to 
there was the pro-
of the applicant for old age 
to make contribution unless she 
not 
hrrn 
It is true we are 
here parties have 
after plaintiff re-
thP spirit of that 
to support 
beeansr iJwrr is a divorce with 
'I'hr basis of those support 
to wife dur-
eontinned after divorce. Thus if he is not 
510 CouNTY oF CoNTRA CosTA v. LASKY [43 C.2d 
r~e!:mr)n,:ihl~e for his wife's marriage 
he should not be after divorce where the funds he pays to his 
ex-wife are the same as he would use to support her during 
marriage. For the same reason the funds are not responsible 
for his 's support after they have reached the 
ex-wife's hands. If they were, then by 
money he handed to her during marriage to pay for 
expenses of the would also be her separate prop-
erty and liable for her mother's support. Neither before nor 
after divorce when he is support, is he making a 
gift to his wife or ex-wife. If one of the purposes of the rule 
excusing him from supporting his wife's parents is that other-
wise there would be an interference with his right of man-
agement of the commu:aity property, the reason still applies 
even though there is a divorce as he has right of control over 
his own funds and has the right to show in the divorce action 
that the alimony should be reduced. The divorce decree and 
its :msceptibility to modification as to alimony is another rea-
son supporting the conclusion here reached. It creates a con-
fusing situation where the court in the divorce action has fixed 
the amount he must pay to support his wife and for another 
court in an action (as we have here) under the Welfare and 
Institutions Code to decide that the alimony is more than 
enough; indeed that there is enough left over to support de-
fendant's mother. After the latter determination presumably 
the ex-husband could request in the divorce action that the 
alimony be reduced. Suppose a reduction is made; the county 
could again, in effect, reverse that decision, by finding there 
was still enough to require plaintiff to support her mother. 
Such detraction from the finality of judgments and multi-
plicity of alterations thereof should not be countenanced un-
less there is unequivocal expression of the Legislature to that 
effect. 
[3] While the court was dealing with a separate mainte-
nance decree and an action by the public agency to compel the 
wife recipient of support money payable thereunder under 
New York welfare laws, the reasoning is persuasive in Appli-
cation of Dunaway, sttpra, 174 Misc. 735 [22 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71]. 
The court in holding that the alimony could not be considered 
in determining the wife's ability to support her father said: 
''I hold that alimony is not income in the true sense of the 
word. It can not be reached in this proceeding. Public policy 
is against it. The Courts have uniformly held that alimony 
in a separation action is awarded for a particular purpose, 
511 
and m ai11tc mmec 
pm·pose <md 
"'l'hc Court has pur:mant to the pro-
visions of § 11G9 of the Civil Practiee Ad, that the sum of 
$:300 per month is reasonable for the care, education and 
maintenanee of the child and for the 
of herself. It is not the of this Court to 
to the order of the Court 
''Alimony is geanted in the j of a Court of Equity 
iu accordance with the eircumstances of the but it 
never loses its distinctive character. 'When awarded, it is 
not so much in the nature of the payment of a debt as in that 
of the performance of a duty. 
''There is no liability on the part of JiJ(lwin S. Clark to sup--
port his father-in--law and ... 'The decree cannot logically 
work the miracle of transforming the duty which he does owe 
into one which he does not and never did owe.' Yet this result 
·would be obtained if the relief sought in this proceeding were 
granted.'' 
[ 4] There is another factor of significance. 'l'he divorce 
decree ordered the payment of the support money for the sup-
port of defendant wife ancl the m·inoT child. No segregation 
was made in the divorce decree showing what portion of the 
monthly payments were for the child's support and what por-
tion for the wife. It is not appropriate for the court in the 
instant action in which the husband is not repr·esented to make 
the apportionment which it ·would have to do before it could 
ascertain defendant's ability. It would have to do that be-
e a use manifestly any portion received by the wife for the 
child's support is not part of her income and cannot be con-
sidered in determining her ability to support her mother. 
'l'he proper forum for making such an allocation, if it must 
be made, is the court in which the divorce decree was rendered. 
(See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 100 Cal.App.2cl 730 [224 P.2d 371] .) 
[5] If we assume the court may make the apportionment 
in the instant action, it did not do so here. Plaintiff has not 
proved how much of the support money was for the child's 
support and hence has failed to supply facts upon which a 
determination could be made respecting the ability of defend-
ant to support her mother. Ability has not been shown when 
a portion of the income proved was not defendant's but was 
for the child. 
We hold, therefore, that in the absence of proof of other 
,J., 
,J ., 
]' In Oct. 
'l'HOlVIAS H. KENNAL Petitioner, v. SUPERIOI" 
COURT OF SAN MATEO 
FRANK D. in Interest. 
[1] Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies.-Writ of 
tion may issue if there other and lower 
court is in excess of Code Civ. 
[2] !d.-Adequacy of 
strain court from further Pr•JceedJ:ng 
slander does not have 
under Code Civ. 
or dismiss the cross-action. 
lS 1'PCn111rPrt 
filing of undertaking 
[3] Appeal-Decisions Appealable.--Order 
is not 
§ 
[ 4] Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies.-If seek-
to restrain court from further on cross-com-
forced to trial without 
§ and had to await relief on 
such relief would be 
of "in the progress 
the " and section would he defeated. 
[5] !d.-Grounds for Relief-Excess of Jnrisdiction.~-A court acts 
in excess of its used in 
whether writ if it nctR in violation 
of a statute defining its 
[6] !d.-Application of Rules-Slander Cases.-Prohibition will lie 
where plaintiff in slander after fails 
to file w•r"'"''"'' 
